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THOMAS W. MERRILL 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE 
OF SEPARATION OF POWERS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court has had many occasions in recent years 
to consider what it calls "the constitutional principle of separation 
of powers."' The principle in question has been effusively praised2 
and on occasion vigorously enforced.3 But just what is it? The 
Court clearly believes that he Constitution contains an organizing 
principle that is more than the sum of the specific clauses that 
govern relations among the branches. Yet notwithstanding the 
many testimonials to the importance of the principle, its content 
remains remarkably elusive. 
The central problem, as many have observed,4 is that he Court 
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1 The phrase appears in the Court's statement of the question presented in Metropolitan 
Washington Airports Auth. v Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 111 S Ct 2298, 2301 
(1991). 
2 See, e.g., Freytag v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 111 S Ct 2631, 2634 (1991) ("the 
central guarantee of a just government"); Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361, 380 (1989) 
("essential to the preservation of liberty"). 
3On five occasions in recent years, the Court has invalidated federal legislation on 
separation-of-powers grounds: Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v Citizens for Abatement 
of of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 111 S Ct 2298 (1991); Bowsher v Synar, 478 US 714 (1986); INS v 
Chadha, 462 US 919 (1983); Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 
US 50 (1982); and Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1 (1976). 
4 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish and Elizabeth Cisar, "If Angels Were to Govern": The Need 
for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 Duke L J 449 (1991); Rebecca L. 
Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U Pa L Rev 1513, 1522-31 (1991); Harold 
J. Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 Vir L Rev 1253 (1988); 
? 1992 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 
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226 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW [1991 
has employed two very different conceptions of separation of pow- 
ers in recent years. On the one hand, there is the "formal" under- 
standing, emphasizing that "[t]he Constitution sought to divide the 
delegated powers of the new Federal government into three defined 
categories, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, to assure, as nearly 
as possible, that each branch of government would confine itself 
to its assigned responsibility."s On the other hand, there is the 
"functional" understanding, stressing that the three branches do 
not "operate with absolute independence," and that the Constitu- 
tion requires only that "the proper balance between the coordinate 
branches" be maintained.6 The Court has alternated between the 
formal and the functional constructions, with a swing group of 
Justices evidently happy to embrace one or the other as suits the 
needs of the moment.7 
When we step back from the doctrinal inconstancy and examine 
the outcomes of the Court's recent separation-of-powers decisions, 
however, a readily discernible pattern emerges. The formal theory 
is regularly used in evaluating (and invalidating) attempts by Con- 
gress to exercise governmental power by means other than the 
enactment of legislation;8 the more elastic functional approach is 
favored in reviewing (and approving) duly-enacted legislation that 
regulates or reallocates the functions performed by the other two 
branches.9 Unfortunately, this pattern does not follow from the 
Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism after the New Deal, 101 Harv L Rev 421, 493-96 (1987); 
Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Que tions-a Foolish 
Inconsistency? 72 Cornell L Rev 488 (1987); Thomas O. Sargentich, The Contemporary Debate 
about Legislative-Executive Separation of Powers, 72 Cornell L Rev 430, 433 (1987). 
s INS v Chadha, 462 US 919, 951 (1983). 
6 Morrison v Olson, 487 US 654, 694, 695 (1988), quoting United States v Nixon, 418 US 
683, 707 (1974) and Nixon v Administrator of General Services, 433 US 425, 443 (1977). 
7 On the last day of the 1985 Term, the Court handed down two separation-of-powers 
decisions. One, Bowsher v Synar, 478 US 714 (1986), applied a highly formal analysis to 
invalidate part of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act; the other, Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm'n v Schor, 478 US 833 (1986), adopted a functional understanding to uphold the 
jurisdiction of an administrative agency over common-law counterclaims. Chief Justice 
Burger, Justice Powell, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice O'Connor joined both majority 
opinions. 
8 Bowsher v Synar, 478 US 714 (1986) (congressional agent cannot control execution of the 
laws); INS v Chadha, 462 US 919 (1983) (one-House legislative veto unconstitutional); Buckley 
v Valeo, 424 US 1 (1976) (members of Congress cannot exercise appointments power over 
nonlegislative officers). 
9 Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361 (1989) (Sentencing Commission with rulemaking 
powers permissible as part of judicial branch); Morrison v Olson, 487 US 654 (1988) (federal 
court may appoint independent counsel to investigate and prosecute crimes by high execu- 
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tenets of either formalism or functionalism. Applied consistently, 
formalism would impose strict limitations on efforts to scramble 
executive and judicial functions,10 and functionalism would proba- 
bly lead the Court to uphold at least some of the extra-legislative 
congressional controls that have been disapproved." All of which 
suggests that neither formalism nor functionalism provides a satis- 
factory account of the constitutional principle of separation of 
powers-at least as it operates in practice. 
In the 1990 Term the Court decided two cases that required it 
to revisit the constitutional principle of separation of powers- 
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v Citizens for the Abatement 
of Aircraft Noise, Inc.12 and Freytag v Commissioner of Internal Reve- 
nue." In terms of doctrinal development, neither decision does 
much to clear up the "incoherent muddle""14 of recent years. But 
in terms of outcomes, we see the same pattern repeated once again. 
In Washington Airports, the Court reviewed another attempt at 
extra-legislative Congressional control: legislation that would allow 
members of Congress, serving as a state "Board of Review," to veto 
decisions of a regional airports authority. True to pattern, the 
Court invoked the constitutional principle of separation of powers 
and struck it down. By contrast, Freytag involved a challenge to the 
allocation of functions between the executive and judicial branches: 
whether the Chief Judge of the Tax Court (a non-Article III tribu- 
nal) was either a "Head of Department" or "Court of Law" for 
tive officials); Commodity Futures Trading Commission v Schor, 478 US 833 (1986) (administra- 
tive agency may adjudicate common-law couterclaim); Nixon v Administrator of General Ser- 
vices, 433 US 425, 443 (1977) (controls on disposition of Presidential papers permissible). 
The principal exception is Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 
US 50 (1982), where Justice Brennan's plurality opinion used a formal analysis to invalidate 
portions of the jurisdiction of the bankrupcty courts as being inconsistent with the judicial 
function of Article III courts. This aspect of Northern Pipeline, however, does not appear to 
have survived subsequent decisions. See note 91. 
10 This is the view of Justice Scalia, the Court's most consistent champion of formalism. 
See Morrison, 487 US at 703-15 (Scalia dissenting); Mistretta, 488 US at 413-27 (Scalia 
dissenting). See also Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 Cal 
L Rev 853 (1990) (detailing the impact that a rigorous formalism would have on territorial 
courts). 
" This is the position of Justice White, the one Justice who has steadfastly endorsed a 
functional approach. See Washington Airports, 111 S Ct at 2317-21 (White dissenting); 
Bowsher, 478 US at 776 (White dissenting); Chadba, 462 US at 998-1002 (White dissenting). 
12 111 S Ct 2298 (1991). 
3 111 S Ct 2631 (1991). 
14 Brown, 139 U Pa L Rev at 1517 (cited in note 4). 
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Appointments Clause purposes.5" Although the Court split 5-4 
over the answer to this question, not a single vote could be mus- 
tered to endorse the formalist answer urged by the petitioners: 
that the Chief Judge was neither, and hence that the appointment 
authority was unconstitutional. Last Term's cases thus deepen the 
paradox of the Court applying a "notorious inconsistency of 
method"16 to generate quite consistent outcomes. 
In this article, I will argue for a new understanding the constitu- 
tional principle of separation of powers, what I will call the "mini- 
mal" conception. I developed this alternative inductively, by re- 
flecting on what theory, if applied consistently, might generate a 
pattern of results similar to the one reached by the Court. I do not, 
however, suggest that the minimal conception supplies a positive 
explanation for the Court's decisions; there may be a variety of 
reasons that account for the Court's performance.17 Instead, I offer 
it as a possible understanding of what the constitutional principle 
of separation of powers should mean, and will argue that, if 
adopted as a normative standard for decision-making, it would out- 
perform formalism and functionalism on a number of fronts, in- 
cluding but not limited to its capacity to generate outcomes congru- 
ent with those of the past. 
The foundation of the minimal conception is a simple rule: there 
are only three branches of government, and every federal office 
must be accountable to one of these branches. Thus, an attempt 
by Congress to create a "Fourth Branch" of the federal government 
would be unconstitutional. Moreover, because every federal office 
must be located "in" one of the three branches, each office is subject 
to whatever specific constitutional limitations apply to action by 
its branch. For example, a federal office that is an agent of Congress 
(like the Board of Review in Washington Airports) would be subject 
to the same Bicameral and Presentment requirements that apply to 
Congress itself. Because such an agent could not comply with these 
requirements, it would be unconstitutional. 
15 The Appointments Clause permits Congress to vest the appointment of "inferior offi- 
cers" (such as the Special Trial Judge at issue in Freytag) "in the President alone, in the 
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." US Const Art II, ? 2, cl 2. 
16 Geoffrey P. Miller, Rights and Structure in Constitutional Theory, 8 Social Philos & Policy 
196, 201 (1991). 
17 See text at note 105. 
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Like formalism, the minimal conception rests on a rule-like un- 
derstanding of the constitutional principle of separation of powers. 
But unlike both formalism and functionalism, the minimal concep- 
tion would reject the idea that separation of powers is concerned 
with achieving a particular allocation of "legislative," "judicial," 
and "executive" functions among the three branches. Instead, it 
would treat questions about the correct definition of the govern- 
mental powers mentioned in the Vesting Clauses of Articles I, II, 
and III, and their assignment to different branches, to be nonjusti- 
ciable political questions consigned to the discretion of Congress. 
Thus, under the minimal understanding Congress would be free 
to delegate "functions" any way it wants, but would be strictly 
limited in its options as to who could receive the deletation: only 
the three constitutional branches and their agents. 
I will argue that the minimal conception would avoid the more 
glaring problems associated with formalism and functionalism, and 
would have several other attractive features as well. Because it 
would produce results consistent with the outcomes of virtually all 
the Supreme Court's major separation of powers decisions, it 
would provide a substantial measure of continuity with established 
understandings about the structure of government. Moreover, be- 
cause it would prevent evasion of specific clauses of the Constitu- 
tion that limit the power of the branches, and would promote a 
diffusion of power among the branches, it would achieve important 
purposes traditionally associated with the doctrine of separation of 
powers. Finally, it would be broadly consistent with both the text 
of the Constitution and with James Madison's explanation of how 
the structural features of that document would work to preserve 
liberty. 
II. UNPACKING FORMALISM AND FUNCTIONALISM 
Part of the problem in trying to make sense of the Court's 
recent separation-of-powers jurisprudence is that the two doc- 
trines deployed by the Court and commentators-formalism and 
functionalism-are complex rather than simple ideas.18 Although 
"8 For a compendium of the literature on formalism versus functionalism, see Brown, 139 
U Pa L Rev at 1522-31 (cited in note 4). The tenets of formalism are spelled out more fully 
in Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v Olson: A Formalistic Perspective on Why the Court Was Wrong, 
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nearly always treated as alternatives along a single dimension,19 the 
formal/functional dichotomy in fact operates at two different lev- 
els. At one level, it refers to different methods of justification em- 
ployed by the Court, and mirrors the more general distinction in 
law between formal and functional styles of legal reasoning.20 At 
another level, however, the dichotomy refers to different substan- 
tive interpretations of the Constitution. Although the two levels of 
the formal/functional distinction are closely linked in the cases and 
commentary, it is useful to unpack them, if only because doing so 
reveals the possibility of adopting a substantive interpretation of 
the constitutional structure different from those embedded in the 
current understandings of formalism and functionalism. 
At the methodological level, the formal/functional dichotomy 
parallels the familiar division in law between rules and standards. 
Here, the formalist insists that the structural provisions of the Con- 
stitution establish a set of rules-an "instruction manual"21-that 
must be followed whatever the consequences. The formalist hus 
adopts what amounts to a deontological theory of justification: sep- 
aration of powers is a rule that must be followed because it is laid 
down in the Constitution and the Constitution is supreme law.22 
The rule may have a higher-order justification-such as diffusing 
power the better to protect liberty. But, for the formalist, realiza- 
tion of such an end is seen as depending in good part on preserving 
the rule-like quality of the inquiry.23 As the Court stated in Chadha, 
"the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and 
useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will 
not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution."24 
38 Am U L Rev 313 (1989); Gary Lawson, 78 Cal L Rev 853 (cited in note 10); David P. 
Currie, The Distribution of Powers after Bowsher, 1986 Supreme Court Review 19. For a 
thoughtful defense of functionalism, see Peter Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: 
Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum L Rev 573 (1984). 
'19 See, e.g., Strauss, 72 Cornell L Rev at 488 (cited in note 4). 
20 See generally, Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 Yale L J 509 (1988). 
21 Gary Lawson, In Praise of Woodenness, 11 Geo Mason L Rev 21, 22 (1988). See also 
Sargentich, 72 Cornell L Rev at 458 n 31 (cited in note 4). 
22 Sunstein, Constitutionalism after the New Deal, 101 Harv L Rev at 493; see also Stephen 
Carter, From Sick Chicken to Synar: The Evolution and Subsequent De-Evolution of the Separation 
of Powers, 1987 BYU L Rev 719, 735-43 (describing "de-evolutionary" tradition); Geoffrey 
P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Supreme Court Review 41, 53-58 (describing "neoclas- 
sical" approach). 
23 Redish & Cisar, 41 Duke L J at 127-28 (cited in note 4). 
24 Chadba, 462 US at 944. 
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The functionalist, in contrast, argues that structural disputes 
should be resolved not in terms of fixed rules but rather in light of 
an evolving standard designed to advance the ultimate purposes of 
a system of separation of powers.25 Accordingly, the functional 
approach adopts a consequentialist heory of justification: the task 
of the court is to judge institutional arrangements in terms of their 
contribution toward attaining certain ends. The Court's functional- 
ist opinions have consistently described the underlying purpose of 
a system of separation of powers in terms of preserving individual 
liberty;26 functionally oriented commentators have proposed varia- 
tions on this theme.27 But all functionalists agree that legislation 
should be invalidated only when it disserves these ultimate ends. 
At the second level, the formal/functional distinction reflects 
different substantive interpretations of the Constitution. At this 
level, interestingly, formalists and functionalists tart with the 
same premise: that the constitutional principle of separation of 
powers is concerned with the allocation of governmental functions 
among the different branches of government. Indeed, both groups 
generally agree with the traditional understanding that governmen- 
tal activities can be classified under three functional headings- 
legislative, executive, or judicial-with each function associated 
with one of the three branches of government.28 Where they dis- 
agree is over what sorts of deviations are permitted from the one 
function-one branch equation. 
A pure formalist embraces what I will call an "exclusive func- 
tions" interpretation of the relationship between functions and 
branches. On this view, each of the three branches has exclusive 
25 Sunstein, 101 Harv L Rev at 495 (cited in note 22); see also Carter, 1987 BYU L Rev 
at 722-35 (describing "evolutionary" tradition) (cited in note 22); Miller, 1986 Supreme 
Court Review at 41 (cited in note 22) (describing "pragmatic" approach). 
26 Freytag, 111 S Ct at 2634; Mistetta, 488 US at 380; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v 
Sawyer, 343 US 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson concurring); Myers v United States, 272 US 52, 
294-95 (1926) (Brandeis dissenting). 
27 See Brown, 139 U Pa L Rev at 1516 (cited in note 4) (ultimate question is "the potential 
effect of the arrangement on individual due-process interests"); Paul Verkuil, Separation of 
Powers, the Rule of Law, and the Idea of Independence, 30 Wm & Mary L Rev 301 (1989) (basic 
purpose is to avoid conflicts of interest). Some commentators have also posited that a central 
purpose of separation of powers is to control rent-seeking factions. See Miller, 8 Social 
Philos & Policy 196 (cited in note 16). 
28 See, e.g., Humphrey's Executor v United States, 295 US 602, 630-32 (1935); Myers v United 
States, 272 US 52, 161 (1926); Massachusetts v Mellon, 262 US 447, 488 (1923); Wayman v 
Southard, 10 Wheat 1, 46 (1825). 
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authority to perform its assigned function, unless the Constitution 
itself permits an exception.29 In effect, the Vesting Clauses of Arti- 
cles I, II, and III are construed as establishing a prima facie alloca- 
tion of a single function to each of the branches of government. 
This allocation may be ignored only if a specific clause of the 
Constitution authorizes a deviation. For example, the Vesting 
Clause of Article I establishes a prima facie allocation of "all legisla- 
tive power" to the Congress. Under the Presentment Clause,30 
however, the President is expressly permitted to participate in the 
legislative power by exercising the veto. Absent some such excep- 
tion grounded in constitutional text, however, the proper classifi- 
cation of any governmental ctivity according to its function estab- 
lishes which branch may exclusively perform it. 
The substantive constitutional theory of the functionalists is 
harder to pin down. All functionalists reject the exclusive functions 
idea, and believe that many governmental activities can be catego- 
rized as falling within more than one function; they would have 
courts defer to the allocation established by Congress in these 
doubtful cases.31 And all functionalists believe that the primary 
objective of judicial review in separation of powers cases is to insure 
that each branch retains "enough" governmental power to permit 
it to operate as an effective check on the other branches of govern- 
ment.32 In the most extreme version of functionalism, the idea of a 
specified allocation of functions would disappear altogether, leaving 
only the notion of a general diffusion or balancing of power among 
the branches. Separation of powers would on this view become 
indistinguishable from a free-floating checks and balances.33 Most 
functionalists would not go that far, but would instead embrace a 
"core functions" theory.34 This posits the existence of a nucleus of 
29 Mistretta, 488 US at 426 (Scalia dissenting); Redish & Cisar, 41 Duke L J 449 (cited in 
note 4); Lawson, 78 Cal L Rev at 857-58 (cited in note 10). The formal theory is equivalent 
to what M. J. C. Vile calls the "pure doctrine" of separation of powers, with the addition 
of the qualification that text-based exceptions are permissible. See M. J. C. Vile, Constitution- 
alism and the Separation of Powers 13 (1967). 
30 Art I, ? 7, cl 2. 
3~ See Brown, 139 U Pa L Rev at 1527-29 (cited in note 4). 
32 Id at 1527. 
33 Sargentich, 72 Cornell L Rev at 433 (cited in note 4). 
34 See Bowsher, 478 US at 776 (White dissenting); Chadha, 462 US at 1000 (White dis- 
senting); Nixon v Administrator f General Services, 433 US 425, 443 (1977). 
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activities that uniquely belongs to each of the three branches, and 
that cannot be reassigned by Congress. Although courts would 
defer to Congress outside these areas, they would step in to prevent 
any tampering with the core.3s The reason for preserving such a 
core, however, is again to insure that a balance or equilibrium of 
power is maintained among the branches. 
Two important insights emerge from breaking formalism and 
functionalism down into their composite elements in this fashion. 
First, we can see that the criticisms most commonly leveled against 
formalism and functionalism are attributable more to their substan- 
tive theories than their methodological commitments. Formalism 
is often attacked on the ground that the definitions of the legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers are elusive and lead to a question- 
begging analysis.36 The elusiveness of the functional categories 
poses special difficulties for formalism, however, only because of 
the assumption of its substantive theory that each function is 
uniquely assigned to one branch. For example, in INS v Chadha,37 
the same activity-determining whether deportation of an alien 
should be suspended-was described by Chief Justice Burger as 
"legislative" when performed by one House of Congress, and as 
"executive" when performed by the Attorney General.3" For good 
measure, Justice Powell in his concurring opinion described it as 
"adjudicatory."39 Since the classification of House's decision as a 
"legislative act" was critical to the outcome under the formal the- 
ory, commentators had a field day lampooning the Court's rea- 
soning.40 
35 Moreover, most functionalists probably believe it is permissible for Congress to assign 
certain activities to entities that operate outside the chain of command of the three constitu- 
tional branches, as long as the core functions of the constitutional branches are not violated. 
Indeed, the creation of a Fourth Branch of government (or a Fifth or Sixth Branch) may be 
viewed as salutary, insofar as it creates yet another power center that can check and balance 
concentrated power. 
36 As Justice Stevens has wryly noted, "a particular function, like a chameleon, will often 
take on the aspect of the office to which it is assigned." Bowsher, 478 US at 749 (Stevens 
concurring). 
37 462 US 919 (1983). 
38 Id at 952, 953 n 16. 
39 Id at 964. 
4 See Laurence H. Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision: A Law by Any Other Name? 21 
Harv J Legis 1 (1984); E. Donald Elliott, INS v Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the 
Constitution, and the Legislative Veto, 1983 Supreme Court Review 125; Girardeau A. Spann, 
Deconstructing the Legislative Veto, 68 Minn L Rev 473 (1984). 
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Formalism is also attacked on the ground that it tends "to strait- 
jacket the government's ability to respond to new needs in creative 
ways, even if those ways pose no threat to whatever might be 
posited as the basic purposes of the constitutional structure."41 
Again, the exclusivity postulate of formalism's ubstantive theory 
is the root of the problem. If each branch has only one function 
(absent a constitutional exception), then multifunctional enti- 
ties-for example, administrative agencies that perform all three 
functions-would be unconstitutional.42 To avoid this extreme 
conclusion, formalists are forced to adopt a grandfather strategy, 
preserving past deviations from formalist purity (like administrative 
agencies) based on stare decisis or a principle of historical settle- 
ment, while subjecting new innovations to scrutiny under a rigor- 
ous exclusive functions canon.43 This solution, however, leads di- 
rectly to the "straitjacket" that the functionalists complain about. 
As Justice White has asked, if in the past the Court has sanctioned 
deviations from constitutional purity, and those deviations are 
grandfathered, how do we know the proper response to new devia- 
tions should be automatic disapproval-especially if a plausible 
case can be made that the new deviation is designed to correct an 
imbalance caused by the old one?44 
The principal criticism leveled against functionalism is not that 
it is too rigid but that it is not rigid enough.45 The problem, again, 
derives largely from the substantive theory, and in particular from 
the nebulousness of the concepts of "diffusion of power" and "core 
functions." Because these concepts are so indeterminant, he judi- 
cial reaction will almost always be to defer to the judgments of 
41 Brown, 139 U Pa L Rev at 1526 (cited in note 4). 
42 Id at 1524; Harold Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 Yale L J 
451, 498-99 (1979); Strauss, 84 Colum L Rev at 596 (cited in note 18). 
43 This is the strategy pursued by Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline 
Co. v Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 US 50 (1982). There, Justice Brennan asserted that the 
adjudicatory function belongs exclusively to Article III courts, subject to three exceptions 
designed to cover preexisting deviations: territorial courts, military courts, and tribunals 
considering questions involving "public rights." Id at 63-70. Because the adjudication of 
common law claims did not fall within any of the three exceptions, the Northern Pipeline 
plurality reasoned that the power to hear such claims could not be given to the Bankruptcy 
Court, a non-Article III tribunal. 
44 See Chadba, 462 US at 1002-03 (1983) (dissent). 
45 Redish & Cisar, 41 Duke L J 449 (cited in note 4); Stephen Carter, Constitutional 
Improprieties: Reflections on Mistretta, Morrison, and Administrative Government, 57 U Chi L Rev 
357, 375-76 (1990). 
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other branches when separation of powers controversies arise. The 
arguments in support of innovation will be concrete and immedi- 
ate, while the case for preserving "diffusion" or the "core" will 
seem abstract and remote.46 Thus, the "core" functions notice is 
unlikely to achieve its stated aim: the preservation of a system of 
separated and balanced powers as a guarantee of liberty.47 
Unpacking the strands of formalism and functionalism also 
allows us to see that although there is a natural affinity between 
the methodological and substantive sides of each understanding, 
the linkage is contingent rather than logically compelled. For the 
formalist, the exclusive functions construction posits that the con- 
stitutional structure incorporates a complex rule subject to many 
text-based exceptions. This rule-like understanding is obviously 
congenial to a deontological method of justification. On the func- 
tional side, the substantive theory eschews bright line rules in favor 
of more judgmental concepts like diffusion of power and core func- 
tions. These concepts invite a consequentialist methodology that 
examines every challenged institution or practice in terms of its 
impact on the overall purpose of a system of separation of powers. 
But notwithstanding these natural affinities between legal method 
and substantive theory, there is no reason in principle why some 
other substantive theory of the constitutional principle of separa- 
tion of powers could not be adopted. Such a theory might avoid 
the more glaring problems generated by the substantive theories 
associated with formalism and functionalism. And it could be im- 
plemented with either a formal or a functional method of justifica- 
tion, or perhaps some combination of both. 
III. THE MINIMAL CONCEPTION OF SEPARATION OF POWERS 
One pathway to a new substantive theory of separation of 
powers would be to break away from the shared preoccupation 
with the functional c assification fgovernment activities, and fo- 
cus instead on the three branches of government as distinct organi- 
zations subject to specific constitutional limitations on how they 
4 See United States v Nixon, 418 US 683, 712-13 (1974) (President's interest in confidential 
communications is "general in nature" as opposed to the need for relevant evidence which 
is "specific and central to the fair adjudication of a particular criminal case"). 
47 Redish & Cisar, cited in note 4. 
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exercise governmental uthority.48 Specifically, if we start with the 
substantive theory of the formalists, and drop the concern with the 
division of functions, what we would be left with is a "minimal 
conception" of separation of powers that would insist that there are 
only three branches of government, and that every federal office 
must be located in one of the three branches. The substantive 
interpretation of the constitutional principle of separation of pow- 
ers would reduce to a single, simple rule: Congress may not create 
a Fourth Branch of the federal government. 
In effect, under the minimal conception, all questions about the 
correct definition of the "legislative," executive," and "judicial" 
powers, and about how those powers should be allocated among 
the branches, would become nonjusticiable political questions con- 
fined to the discretion of Congress.49 Thus, Congress would be free 
to assign any function to any of the three branches of government. 
What Congress could not do would be to assign functions to an 
entity that is not accountable to one of the three constitutional 
branches, and hence not subject to the specific constitutional limita- 
tions that apply to each branch.5o 
In terms of legal methodology, the central proposition of the 
minimal conception would operate in a highly formalistic fashion. 
The idea that there are only three branches of government, and 
that every federal office must be accountable to one branch, would 
be regarded as a fixed rule derived from the text and structure of 
48 For another attempt along these lines, which has helped clarify my own thinking, see 
Krent, 74 Vir L Rev 1253 (cited in note 4). 
49 Alternatively, one could posit that questions about the definition a d allocation of 
functions should be answered by the "core functions" theory of formalism, which would 
almost always result in their being upheld. See text at note 46. In fact, if I were tasked 
with implementing the minimal understanding, I would not say that the definitional and 
allocational questions are nonjusticiable, but would follow the functionalists and say that 
courts hould intervene todecide these questions when core functions are threatened. Keep- 
ing the core functions idea around would provide some rhetorical continuity with the past, 
and would offer a "failsafe" should Congress in the future ever attempt severely to cripple 
the ability of either the executive or judicial branch to function. See note 115. For heuristic 
reasons, however, I will confine myself here to developing the case for a pure minimal 
approach, which would treat hese questions as nonjusticiable. 
50 Because it would require strict judicial enforcement of the three-branches rule, the mininal approach would be quite different from those theories that would treat all questions 
about the horizontal division of powers as nonjusticiable. See Jesse H. Choper, Judicial 
Review and the National Political Process 260-379 (1980). Cf. Michael J. Perry, The Constitution, 
the Courts, and Human Rights 49-60 (1982) (arguing that separation-of-powers disputes should 
not be justiciable if the political branches agree about the proper esolution). 
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the Constitution and not subject to judicial waiver. The further 
steps in the inquiry, such as attributing federal offices to particular 
branches, and determining whether branch-specific constitutional 
limitations have been violated, could be decided either formalisti- 
cally or under a more flexible, functional inquiry. 
In practice, the minimal conception would require courts to 
make three determinations in any separation-of-powers case. First, 
the court would have to assign the office whose action is being 
challenged to one of the three constitutional branches (or determine 
that it constitutes an unconstitutional attempt to create a Fourth 
Branch). Second, it would have to determine if the action violates 
any specific constitutional limitations that apply to its assigned 
branch. Third, if the action transgresses any branch-specific limita- 
tion, the court would have to consider whether there is any basis 
for concluding that the action should be exempt from these limita- 
tions. A brief elaboration of each step is appropriate at this point; 
I will then offer some illustrations of how the approach would be 
employed in resolving recent separation-of-powers controversies. 
A. ATTRIBUTION RULES 
The first and in many respects key step under the minimal con- 
ception would require the Court to develop rules for assigning 
federal offices51 to the three constitutional branches of government. 
The rules for identifying the components of the constitutional 
branches themselves-members of Congress, the President, and 
federal judges-are set forth with some particularity in the Consti- 
tution itself, and generally should not be problematic.52 The rules 
for identifying federal offices that are agents of one of the branches 
are less self-evident. The Court's decision in Bowsher v Synars3 sug- 
5" By "federal offices" I mean both principal and inferior offices. I will not here discuss 
the important question of how one distinguishes persons holding federal offices from other 
persons performing functions under federal law, such as state officers carrying out federal 
statutory directives or private citizens suing to enforce federal rights. See generally Harold 
J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority 
Outside the Federal Government, 85 Nw U L Rev 62 (1990). Obviously, my thesis presupposes 
that this can be done, otherwise the constitutional principle of separation of powers could 
be circumvented simply by allocating federal functions to private corporations or state 
entities. 
52 US Const, Art I, ? 2, cl 5; Amend XVII; Art II, ? 2, cl 2; Art II, ? 3; Art III, ? 1. 
53 478 US 714 (1986). 
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gests that this inquiry could also be governed by a formal rule: an 
office is an agent of a branch if the members of the branch have 
the power to remove the incumbent officer.s4 Washington Airports, 
in contrast, suggests more of an all-things-considered standard for 
resolving this question. Justice Stevens noted that the Board of 
Review at issue in that case was "an entity created at the initiative 
of Congress, the powers of which Congress has delineated, the 
purpose of which is to protect an acknowledged federal interest, 
and membership in which is restricted to congressional officials."ss5 
He also noted that Congress as a whole could effectively remove a 
member of the Board.s6 Without suggesting that any one of these 
factors was determinative, he concluded that the Board should be 
regarded as exercising federal power as an agent of Congress. My 
own inclination would be to adopt a formal test for attributing 
offices to particular branches, and to make the power to remove 
the exclusive criterion. A simple removal test not only has the 
advantage of reducing uncertainty and litigation costs, it also re- 
flects institutional reality. As the Court noted in Bowsher, once an 
officer is appointed, "it is only the authority that can remove him, 
and not the authority that appointed him, that he must fear and, 
in the performance of his functions, obey."s7 
For present purposes, however, it is not necessary to choose 
between formal and functional methodological approaches to this 
question. I would only note that to the extent the power to remove 
is a relevant factor-as it surely is under either approach-it would 
not necessarily mean the power to remove at will. Bowsher held 
that the Comptroller General is an agent of Congress, even though 
he is removable by Congress only for cause. And Morrison v Olsons8 
expressly disapproved statements in Myers v United Statess9 to the 
4 The Comptroller General (whose powers were at issue in Bowsber), like all other "civil 
officers," was removable by impeachment. US Const Art II, ? 4. But the Court quite rightly 
did not suggest that this made him an agent of Congress. Because impeachments are so rare, 
this power does not act as a realistic day-to-day restraint on the behavior of federal officers. 
55 Washington Airports at 2308. 
56 Id ("Control over committee assignments also gives Congress effective removal power 
over Board members because depriving a Board member of membership in the relevant 
committees deprives the member of authority to sit on the Board."). 
s7 Bowsher, 478 US at 726, quoting Synar v United States, 626 F Supp 1374, 1401 (D DC 
1986); cf. Mistretta, 488 US at 423 (Scalia dissenting) ("It would seem logical to decide the 
question of which Branch an agency belongs to on the basis of who controls its actions."). 
s8 487 US 654 (1988). 
s9 272 US 52 (1926). 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Thu, 05 Nov 2015 17:05:22 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7] THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS 239 
effect hat all executive officers must be removable at will by the 
President. In effect, Morrison placed the independent counsel 
whose office was at issue in that case in the executive branch even 
though the Attorney General could remove her only for "good 
cause." 
The effect of the attribution exercise would be to place most 
federal governmental entities in the executive branch. The congres- 
sional staff and a few offices like the General Accounting Office 
and the Congressional Budget Office would be deemed agents of 
Congress. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 
law clerks, and clerks of court would be agents of the federal courts. 
But most of the entities whose parentage has been a matter of 
controversy in the past-including the independent regulatory 
agencies like the FCC and SEC and Article I courts like the Tax 
Court-would become part of the executive branch. Ironically, the 
event that makes this allocation of offices even thinkable is the 
decision in Morrison-thought by most formalists to be a defeat for 
executive power. Before Morrison, it was assumed that all executive 
officers had to be removable at will by the President, a rule incom- 
patible with the tenure rights enjoyed by the commissioners of 
independent agencies and judges of Article I courts.6o But now 
that Morrison has established that some executive officers can be 
protected by a good cause removal requirement, reconceiving the 
independent agencies and Article I courts as part of the executive 
branch would not be that disruptive to settled institutional arrange- 
ments. 
B. BRANCH-SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS 
Next, having placed the office in one of the three branches, the 
Court would have to determine whether the actions required of 
that office transgress any constitutional limitations specific to the 
branch to which the office is assigned. As Harold Krent has ob- 
served, each branch of government is subject to certain "proce- 
dural" limitations reflected in the text of the Constitution.61 Con- 
gress may generally act only in conformance with the Bicameral 
60 Hence in Humpbrey's Executor v United States, 295 US 602 (1935) and Wiener v United 
States, 357 US 349 (1958), the Court upheld restrictions on the President's removal power 
only after finding that the offices involved were engaged in "quasi-legislative" or "quasi- 
judicial" rather than "executive" functions. 
61 See Krent, 74 Vir L Rev 1253 (cited in note 4). 
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and Presentment Clauses.62 The executive branch, consistent with 
the Take Care Clause, may act only pursuant to authority given 
by legislation or an enumerated constitutional power.63 And the 
federal courts may act only through the adjudication of "cases" 
and "controversies."64 Thus, the process of placing an office in a 
particular branch will generally result in imposing at least one set 
of constitutional limitations on actions taken by that office. 
The procedural limitations identified by Krent do not necessarily 
exhaust the constitutional constraints on action taken by any partic- 
ular branch. Other clauses, like the Appointments Clause, the In- 
compatibility Clause, and the Speech or Debate Clause, also im- 
pose constraints on action by one branch affecting one or more of 
the others. In addition, the Court could conceivably recognize im- 
plied branch-specific limitations. For example, one could read the 
Myers case, even after the qualifications of Morrison, as establishing 
that all principal officers of the executive branch (as opposed to 
inferior officers like the independent counsel in Morrison) must be 
removable at will by the President. Alternatively (or in addition), 
one could reason from the Constitution's creation of a unitary exec- 
utive that the President must be able to issue orders to any subordi- 
nate officer in the executive branch, and deem the failure to obey 
such an order "good cause" for removal.6s It could also be that the 
judicial branch, like the executive, has no inherent power to create 
rules of decision, but must derive its authority to act from some 
source in enacted law, such as the Constitution or a federal 
statute.66 
For present purposes, the point is not to develop a complete 
catalogue of all limitations specific to the actions of each branch. 
It is sufficient to note that there is at least one recognized limitation 
62 Chadha, 462 US 919 (1983). 
63 This is the lesson generally drawn from the Steel Seizure case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v Sawyer, 343 US 579 (1952). See, e.g., Currie, 1986 Supreme Court Review (cited in 
note 18). 
64 Mistretta, 488 US at 385, 389; Morrison, 487 US at 677; Allen v Wright, 468 US 737, 
750 (1984). 
6' See Steven Calabresi and Kevin Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, 
Plural Judiciary, 105 Harv L Rev (forthcoming 1992); Liberman, 38 Am U L Rev at 316-17 
(cited in note 18); Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Supreme Court Review at 86-87 (cited 
in note 22). 
66 As I argue in Thomas W. Merrill, The Judicial Prerogative, 12 Pace L Rev (forthcoming 
1992); see also Currie, 1986 Supreme Court Review at 25 (cited in note 18). 
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applicable to each branch, and that the task of the Court under the 
minimal conception, once it attributes the actions of an office to a 
particular branch, is to determine whether any applicable limita- 
tions have been transgressed. 
C. EXCEPTIONS 
Finally, the Court would have to consider in some cases whether 
an exception from the usual limitations on branch action may be 
applicable. The primary constraints-the Bicameral and Present- 
ment Clauses, the Take Care Clause, and the Cases or Controver- 
sies limitation-should be construed as applying only to exercises 
of governmental authority by each branch. As the Court said in 
Chadha, the Bicameral and Presentment rules apply when a compo- 
nent of Congress takes action that has "the purpose and effect of 
altering the legal rights, duties and relations of persons . . . outside 
the Legislative Branch."''67 By negative implication, actions that do 
not affect he "rights, duties and relations of persons" outside the 
legislative branch would be exempt from these constitutional proce- 
dures. Thus, rules relating to parliamentary procedures, congres- 
sional staff, and use of congressional facilities presumably could be 
adopted by Congress or a designated component of Congress with- 
out complying with the Bicameral and Presentment Clauses. Simi- 
larly, internal operating rules having no impact on the public can 
be adopted by the other branches without complying with specific 
constitutional constraints.68 In addition, specific Clauses of the 
Constitution may create other exceptions. For example, there are 
several express exceptions to the Bicameral and Presentment re- 
quirements.69 Again, the point is not to offer an exhaustive list of 
exceptions, but merely to note their role in a fully formed federal 
offices conception of separation of powers. 
67 462 US at 952. 
68 Thus, for example, the courts can be empowered to adopt rules of procedure through 
a rulemaking process, as authorized by the Rules Enabling Act, 28 USC ? 2072 (1988), 
without offending the Cases or Controversies limitation. The key question would be whether 
such rules are "governmental" or "nongovernmental," that is, whether they are designed to 
control primary (prelitigational) behavior or to control the behavior of attorneys and other 
persons engaged in litigation. Cf. Hanna v Plumer, 380 US 460 (1965). Fairly clearly, such 
an exception would have to be developed in a methodologically functional rather than a 
formal fashion, that is, it would have to be developed in light of the purpose of the exception 
(to limit the Cases or Controversies limitation to exercises of governmental uthority). 
69 See Chadba, 462 US at 955 (listing exceptions). 
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D. ILLUSTRATIONS 
In order to clarify the way in which the minimal conception 
would operate, it may be useful to indicate how that approach 
would resolve some recent separation-of-powers controversies. 
Last Term, Washington Airports involved the question whether 
Congress can use its power over the disposition of federal property 
to induce a state to create an institution exercising what is in effect 
a Congressional veto. Assuming that the financial inducement was 
sufficient to establish that the Board was a federal agency,70 then 
the key question under the minimal conception would be attribu- 
tion. Since Congress as a whole could remove members of the 
Board by taking them off the relevant Congressional committees, 
under the formal criterion the Board would be regarded as an agent 
of Congress. As we have seen, Justice Stevens engaged in an all- 
things-considered inquiry, and reached the same conclusion. 
Once the attribution question is resolved, then the case becomes 
easy. As an agent of Congress, the Board was subject to the same 
constitutional limitations that apply to Congress. Since a decision 
by Congress disapproving action by a regional airports authority 
would have to be approved by both Houses and presented to the 
President for his signature or veto, decisions of the Board must 
also comply with these requirements. Given that the Board could 
not possibly comply with these limitations, the legislation creating 
it should be deemed unconstitutional. 
Mistretta v United States71 concerned the constitutionality of the 
United States Sentencing Commission, an entity composed in part 
of sitting federal judges and given broad powers to prescribe bind- 
ing federal sentencing uidelines. Under the minimal conception, 
the initial task would be to determine where the Commission fits 
in the tripartite constitutional structure. Although described by the 
70 Given that the federal legislation took the form of a conditional grant of federal property 
(a long-term lease of National and Dulles Airports), the Court could easily have required 
more evidence of federal "coercion" of Virginia before attributing the actions of the state- 
created Board to Congress itself. Although the issue is beyond the scope of this paper, the 
implicit conception of "coercion" in Washington Airports seems to be closer to the notion of 
irresistible financial inducement invoked in United States v Butler, 297 US 1 (1936), than to 
the stricter notion of coercion employed in South Dakota v Dole, 483 US 203 (1987) and 
Steward Machine Co. v Davis, 301 US 548 (1937). Whether this portends a permanent shift 
in the Court's atttitude toward conditional grants of money and property remains to be 
seen. 
71 488 US 361 (1989). 
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legislation establishing it "as an independent commission in the 
judicial branch of the United States,"72 under the minimal concep- 
tion the Commission should be regarded as part of the executive 
branch. All members of the Commission are subject to removal by 
the President "for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office or for 
other good cause shown.""73 Under the formal approach to attribu- 
tion, this would settle the matter. The fact that the statute required 
that three members of the Commission be active federal judges- 
although perhaps raising a question under the Appointments 
Clause74-would not change this result. The relevant question is 
whether the office is accountable to the President, not whether the 
President has the power to remove the incumbent officer from all 
forms of government service. The President clearly has the power 
to remove the Article III judges acting in their capacity as Sentenc- 
ing Commissioners, and so they should be regarded as part of the 
executive branch. 
Under a more contextual analysis, the same conclusion should 
be reached. All Commission members, including the three sitting 
federal judges, are appointed by the President. And it is clear that 
the Commission operates independent of direction from the Chief 
Justice, the Judicial Conference, or any other judicial body. Thus, 
the Commission is quite unlike other entities, such as the Adminis- 
trative Office of the United States Courts or the Federal Judicial 
Center, that are generally regarded as being part of the judicial 
branch.75 
Once is it clear that, for separation-of-powers purposes, the Sen- 
tencing Commission is an agent of the executive branch, then the. 
other issues in the case are straightforward. The various challenges 
to the Commission based on the anomaly of rulemaking by an 
entity in the judicial branch would be serious only if the Commis- 
sion were in fact located in the judicial branch.76 The nondelegation 
72 28 USC ? 991(a) (1988). 
73 Id. 
74 See Public Citizen v United States, 491 US 440, 488-89 (1989) (Kennedy concurring) 
(arguing that the textual commitment of the appointments power to the President prohibits 
any legislative interference with the President's discretion in selecting nominees). 
71 See Brief for the United States, at 39-40, Mistretta v United States. 
76 Congress' designation of the Commission as an independent commission in the judicial 
branch, 28 USC ? 991(a), might still be important for statutory purposes, such as determin- 
ing whether the Commission is subject to the Freedom of Information Act. See 5 USC 
552(f) (1988). 
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doctrine challenge necessarily fails because it rests on the notions 
about the proper allocation of the "legislative function" rather than 
some specific constitutional limitation. And the fact that Article III 
judges were included on the Commission is of no significance, since 
the Incompatibility Clause applies only to Members of Congress, 
and does not prohibit Article III judges from simultaneously serv- 
ing in the executive branch." The minimal conception thus con- 
firms that the Court was correct in upholding the constitutionality 
of the Sentencing Commission. 
Morrison v Olson,78 which considered the constitutionality of the 
independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act, 
is somewhat more difficult. The attribution question may hinge on 
whether one adopts a formal criterion, or a contextual approach. 
The independent counsel is removable by the Attorney General 
for "good cause," thus satisfying the formal criterion for placement 
in the executive branch. But in other respects, the counsel's alle- 
giance is divided between the executive and the judicial branches. 
The counsel must abide by the policies of the Justice Department 
where possible.79 But an Article III court-the Special Division of 
the D.C. Circuit-confirms the counsel's jurisdiction and has the 
power to terminate an investigation.80 If one concludes that, on 
balance, the counsel is an agent of the judicial branch, then the 
statute would be unconstitutional under the minimal approach, 
because the counsel is not confined to the adjudication of cases 
and controversies or permissible internal functions of the judicial 
branch. 
On the other hand, if one finds that the independent counsel is 
an agent of the executive branch-as the formal criterion 
suggests-then most of the provisions of the Act should survive a 
challenge based on the principle of separation of powers. The good 
cause limitation on the power to remove the independent counsel 
is acceptable, as long as the President is afforded other means of 
assuring ultimate control over executive branch officers. And the 
claim that the Act as a whole unduly interferes with "executive" 
functions necessarily fails, because questions about where Congress 
77 See Mistretta, 488 US at 398. 
78 487 US 654 (1988). 
79 28 USC ? 594(f) (1988). 
80 28 USC ? 596(b)(2) (1988). 
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places executive powers are nonjusticiable. The provision giving 
the Special Division the power to terminate the office of the inde- 
pendent counsel, however, would appear to be unconstitutional 
because it transgresses the cases and controversies limitation on the 
judicial power.81 To this limited extent, then, the federal officers 
approach would indicate a result contrary to that reached by the 
Court.82 
IV. THE ADVANTAGES OF THE MINIMAL CONCEPTION 
Even if it is possible to state a third conception of the consti- 
tutional principle of separation of powers, and to show that it could 
be implemented as a legal doctrine, the question remains: what 
claim would it have to our allegiance? Fairly clearly, the minimal 
conception would eliminate the most glaring problems associated 
with formalism and functionalism. Because it would consider ques- 
tions about the proper definition and allocation of "legislative," 
"executive," and "judicial" power to be nonjusticiable, it would 
avoid the source of the question-begging analysis that plagues for- 
malism. Also, by eschewing any review of the questions about the 
distribution of functions, it would permit considerable experimen- 
tation with new forms of multifunctional entities, at least those 
located in the executive branch. Thus, it would eliminate the main 
cause of the "straightjacket" on governmental innovation associated 
with formalism. On the other hand, the three-branches rule at the 
core of the minimal understanding would provide clear signals to 
the judiciary and other actors in government about the outer limits 
of structural experimentation, and thus would avoid the vacuity 
associated with functionalism. 
In addition, there are three positive reasons why the minimal 
conception presents an attractive alternative to formalism and 
functionalism. First, the minimal conception, unlike both formal- 
81 See Krent, 74 Vir L Rev at 1319-21 (cited in note 4). 
82 The consitutionality of the Act was also challenged under the Appointments Clause on 
the grounds that the Special Counsel is a principal officer requiring presidential appoint- 
ment, and that the Appointments Clause does not permit "cross branch" appointments of 
inferior officers. On both scores, I find the reasoning of Justice Scalia's dissent and the D.C. 
Circuit more persuasive than the majority's opinion. See Morrison, 487 US at 715-23 (Scalia 
dissenting); In re Sealed Case, 838 F2d 476 (D C Cir 1988). But since these issues are extrane- 
ous to the question of the meaning of the constitutional principle of separation of powers, 
I will not elaborate on them here. 
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ism or functionalism, is consistent with the outcomes (but not the 
reasoning) of virtually all the Supreme Court's major decisions on 
separation of powers. Second, the minimal conception would fur- 
ther two general purposes of a doctrine of separation of powers: 
preventing evasions of specific clauses limiting the powers of the 
branches, and encouraging a diffusion of power. Third, the mini- 
mal conception is consistent with the text of the Constitution, and 
is in some respects more faithful to the original understanding than 
are its principal rivals. 
A. CONGRUENCE WITH SUPREME COURT OUTCOMES 
While the Court has struggled with the yin and yang of formal- 
ism and functionalism, the outcomes it has reached have been in- 
triguingly consistent. The Court has nearly always rejected claims 
based on the improper assignment of executive and judicial func- 
tions,83 but has regularly sustained claims based on Congressional 
attempts to exercise governmental power in violation of the require- 
ments for enacting valid legislation.84 The same pattern of results 
would be reached under the minimal conception. The minimal 
conception would treat questions about proper allocation of func- 
tions as nonjusticiable; thus, like the Court, it would not overturn 
legislation on the ground that it improperly assigns the executive 
or judicial functions. On the other hand, the minimal conception 
would strictly enforce the requirements of the Bicameral and Pre- 
sentments Clauses, and thus like the Court would invalidate at- 
tempts by Congress to assert extra-legislative governmental power. 
I would go further, however, and argue that the minimal concep- 
tion would produce outcomes that are congruent with virtually all 
of the judgments rendered by the Supreme Court in its leading 
separation-of-powers decisions. 
1. Nondelegation doctrine. The Supreme Court has steadfastly 
maintained that only Congress can exercise the legislative power.85 
Nevertheless, under the rubric of the nondelegation doctrine, the 
Court has also said that Congress may confer significant discretion 
83 See Freytag and cases cited in note 8. 
84 Washington Airports and cases cited in note 7. 
85 Touby v United States, 111 S Ct 1752, 1755 (1991); Mistretta, 488 US 371-72; Field v 
Clark, 143 US 649, 692 (1892). 
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on the other branches, so long as it "lay[s] down by legislative act 
an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized 
to [act] is directed to conform."86 Application of this "intelligible 
principle" doctrine, in turn, has resulted in widespread transfers of 
power to administrative agencies to promulgate "legislative rules"8s7 
functionally indistinguishable from statutes. In the last fifty ears, 
the Court has consistently declined to interfere with such trans- 
fers,88 to the point where, realistically speaking, there is no mean- 
ingful judicial limitation on Congressional decisions to delegate leg- 
islative power to other branches. The minimal conception would of 
course reach the same result by declaring the issue nonjusticiable. 
2. Non-Article III courts. In no area of constitutional law is there 
a greater or more persistent deviation from formal or functional 
theories than that involving the assignment of the judicial function. 
The Supreme Court has permitted controversies between adverse 
parties under federal law to be decided by territorial courts, mili- 
tary courts, District of Columbia courts, various "legislative" 
courts like the Tax Court, and administrative agencies.89 The one 
exception here is Northern Pipeline,90 where the Court invalidated 
a portion of the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts as being 
inconsistent with the vesting of judicial power in Article III courts. 
But recent decisions make clear that the analysis employed by the 
plurality in Northern Pipeline has been confined to its facts.91 Taken 
together, the decisions approving a wide variety of non-Article III 
courts overwhelmingly suggest that there is no judicially enforced 
limitation on assignment of the "judicial" function. The minimal 
conception would reach this same conclusion by declaring such 
questions nonjusticiable. 
s6J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v United States, 276 US 394, 409 (1928). 
87 See Batterton v Francis, 432 US 416, 425 n 9 (1977). 
ss For the most recent decisions that reach this conclusion, see Touby v United States, 111 
S Ct 1752 (1991) (upholding delegation of power to criminalize possession of drugs); Skinner 
v Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 US 212 (1989) (upholding delegation of power to set rates 
of taxation); Mistretta (upholding delegation of power to set criminal sentencing uidelines). 
'See generally Lawson, 78 Cal L Rev 853 (cited in note 10); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of 
Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 Harv L Rev 916 (1988). 
90 458 US 50 (1982). 
91 See Freytag, 111 S Ct at 2644 ("judicial power" may be given to non-Article III court); 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v Schor, 478 US 833 (1986) (administrative agency may 
adjudicate common-law claim); Thomas v Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 US 
568 (1985) (value of trade secrets may be fixed by non-Article III forum). 
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3. Removal cases. The Court has decided four major cases that 
consider whether a congressional restriction on the President's 
power to remove subordinate officers interferes with the "executive 
power" given to the President by Article II. In one-Myers v United 
States92-the Court held that the restriction was unconstitutional. 
In the remaining three cases93 the restriction was upheld. Although 
the reasoning of these four decisions is impossible to reconcile, the 
outcomes all comport with those that would be reached under the 
minimal conception. In Myers, the restriction took the form of a 
requirement that any removal of a postmaster first class be con- 
firmed by the Senate.94 This was a legislative veto, unconstitutional 
under the Bicameral and Presentment Clauses. In the other three 
cases, the restriction took the form of limiting the President's power 
of removal to a finding of good cause, and in each case the restric- 
tion was upheld. Thus, when the sole foundation for the claim is 
interference with the assignment of the executive function to the 
President, the claim has been rejected, consistent with the minimal 
conception. 
4. Legislative attempts to execute the laws. On several other occa- 
sions, the Court has invalidated legislation said to permit the legis- 
lature to perform executive functions.95 But the holdings of each 
of these cases can be explained on the basis of specific constitutional 
limitations: in each case Congress either transgressed the Bicameral 
and Presentment Clauses,96 or violated an expressly enumerated 
Presidential power, such as the Appointments Clause or the Pardon 
Power.97 Thus, the results in these cases would not be disturbed 
under the minimal conception, which would not permit Congress 
to transgress express constitutional limitations on its power. 
5. Executive privilege cases. In three cases involving former Presi- 
dent Nixon, the Court has recognized an "executive privilege" 
92 272 US 52 (1926). 
93 Morrison v Olson, 487 US 654 (1988); Wiener v United States, 357 US 349 (1958); Hum- 
phrey's Executor v United States, 295 US 602 (1935). 
94 See 272 US at 107. 
95 Washington Airports, 111 S Ct at 2312; Bowsher, 478 US at 726; Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 
1, 140 (1976); Springer v Philippine Islands, 277 US 189, 205-06 (1928); United States v Klein, 
80 US 128, 148 (1872). 
96 Washington Airports, 111 S Ct at 2312; Bowsher, 478 US at 754-56 (Stevens concurring); 
Springer, 277 US at 203. 
97 Buckley, 424 US at 143; Klein, 80 US at 147-48. 
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based on general considerations of separation of powers.98 Such a 
privilege has no express textual foundation, and would have to be 
grounded in an understanding of the President's assigned responsi- 
bility to perform "executive" functions. Recognition of such a privi- 
lege runs counter to the minimal conception, but the ultimate hold- 
ing of two of these cases was to deny the Presidential claim.99 
Although the claim was sustained in the third, the Court reserved 
the question whether Congress could override the privilege, sug- 
gesting that the holding was not constitutionally compelled.1? 
Thus, the actual outcome reached in these cases does not necessar- 
ily conflict with the minimal conception. 
6. Foreign affairs cases. Finally, in the foreign affairs and national 
defense context, there are statements suggesting that the President 
may act in exigent circumstances without specific legal authoriza- 
tion, contrary to the implication that the minimal conception would 
draw from the Take Care Clause.1"' However, most of the deci- 
sions in this area can be explained on alternative grounds-either 
the President's action could be sustained under a specific clause of 
the Constitution, such as the Commander-in-Chief or Receiving 
Ambassadors provisions,102 or under existing statutory authority, 
broadly construed.103 Thus, the actual holdings of the cases are not 
necessarily inconsistent with an understanding that the Take Care 
Clause imposes a general limitation on executive action. 
We can thus see that the Supreme Court's leading separation 
of powers decisions trace a generally consistent pattern overall. 
Claims grounded solely on an assertion about the correct allocation 
of functions among branches almost invariably fail; claims based 
98 Nixon v Fitzgerald, 457 US 731 (1982); Nixon v Administrator of General Services, 433 US 
425, 446-55 (1977); United States v Nixon, 418 US 683 (1974). 
99 Nixon v Administrator, 433 US at 455; United States v Nixon, 418 US at 713. 
100 Nixon v Fitzgerald, 457 US at 748 n 27. 
101 United States v Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 US 304, 319-20 (1936); The Prize Cases, 2 Black 
635, 668 (1863). 
102 For example, United States v Belmont, 301 US 324, 330 (1937) (power to enter into 
executive agreements derived from Receiving Ambassadors Clause); The Prize Cases, 2 Black 
at 668 (power to act in military emergency supported by President's power as Commander- 
in-Chief). 
103 E.g., Dames & Moore v Regan, 453 US 654 (1981). 
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on the violation of a specific textual imitation on action by a branch 
will succeed if the Court concludes that the limitation has in fact 
been transgressed."1 There may be a variety of explanations for 
this phenomenon. It could be, for example, that the presence of a 
specific clause like the Presentment Clause or the Appointments 
Clause increases the Court's confidence about interposing its judg- 
ment against that of the political branches. Or it could be that 
the pattern reflects a bias in favor of the executive branch.15o The 
important point, for present purposes, is that the pattern is fully 
consistent with the results that would be reached under the mini- 
mal conception, which would make questions about the definition 
and allocation of functions nonjusticiable, but would strictly en- 
force specific limitations on the branches. 
At a theoretical level, how much significance one attributes to 
this congruence depends on how one conceives of the role of the 
Supreme Court in interpreting the Constitution, and one's theory 
of precedent. If one regards the Supreme Court's decisions as au- 
thoritative, and adopts a theory of precedent that stresses the judg- 
ments reached in light of the material facts,1" then the evidence 
of consistency would be very powerful support for the minimal 
conception. But if one does not regard Supreme Court decisions 
as authoritative (as opposed to, say, the original intentions of the 
Framers), or if one adopts a theory of precedent that stresses the 
104 Individual Justices have also perceived this pattern. See Chadba, 462 US at 999 (White 
dissenting) ("The separation-of-powers doctrine has heretofore led to the invalidation of 
Government action only when the challenged action violated some express provision in the 
Constitution."); Public Citizen v United States, 491 US 440, 484-85 (1989) (Kennedy concur- 
ring) (noting that the Court employs a "balancing test" where the power at issue is "thought 
to be encompassed within the general grant to the president of the 'executive Power,' " but 
that "where the Constitution by explicit text commits the power at issue to the exclusive 
control of the President, we have refused to tolerate any intrusion by the Legislative 
Branch"). 
o10 See Erwin Chemerinsky, A Paradox Without a Principle: A Comment on the Burger Court's 
Jurisprudence in Separation of Powers Cases, 60 S Cal L Rev 1083 (1987). The pro-executive 
bias explanation was dealt a severe setback by Morrison, where the Court, over the vigorous 
objections of the Solicitor General, curtailed the scope of the President's removal power 
recognized in Myers. The Court also rejected the position of the Solicitor General in Mis- 
tretta, Freytag, and Washington Airports, although in the last case the effect of the Court's 
decision was to give the executive more protection against Congressional aggrandizement 
than it sought. 
106 See Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 Yale L J 161 
(1930). For a recent discussion, see Charles W. Collier, Precedent and Legal Authority: A 
Critical History, 1988 Wis L Rev 771. 
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reasons given by the Court rather than the judgments rendered on 
material facts, then the evidence would be less than compelling. 
On a more practical level, however, the congruence must be 
regarded significant, if only as a measure of continuity with 
our institutional past. As Justice Frankfurter once observed in this 
context, "[d]eeply embedded traditional ways of conducting gov- 
ernment" represent "the gloss which life has written" on the words 
of the Constitution.107 The outcomes the Court has reached in 
resolving major separation-of-powers controversies reflect that 
gloss and in turn shape it. Ordinarily, of course, the articulated 
understanding of the Supreme Court is also an important ingredi- 
ent in comprehending the past and providing guidance for the fu- 
ture. But where the Court has developed two rivalrous understand- 
ings of the constitutional principle of separation of powers, neither 
of which can account for the full range of its judgments, the Court's 
reasons naturally play a less significant role. Because the minimal 
understanding would reach essentially the same outcomes the 
Court has arrived at (by whatever means), it would largely preserve 
the settled pattern of institutional arrangements under our Consti- 
tution. 
B. PROMOTING THE PURPOSES OF SEPARATION OF POWERS 
The minimal construction would also advance two important 
purposes associated with a doctrine of separation of powers: it 
would prohibit evasion of the specific clauses of the Constitution 
that limit the governing authority of the branches, and it would 
promote a diffusion of power among the branches. If Congress 
were free to create a Fourth Branch of government, that is, an 
entity not accountable or subject to the limitations that apply to 
the three constitutional branches, then it would be easy to circum- 
vent these provisions altogether. For example, Congress could by- 
pass the Cases or Controversies limitation of Article III by enacting 
a statute making the Justices of the Supreme Court an independent 
agency with power to render advice to the President. Alternatively, 
Congress could evade the Presentment Clause by constituting both 
Houses of Congress an independent agency and delegating to that 
agency the power to promulgate legislative rules. 
107 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer, 343 US 579, 610 (1952) (concurring opinion). 
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The decisions in Chadha, Bowsher, and Washington Airports ug- 
gest that the Court is sensitive to the problem of evasion. When 
Congress adopts legislation delegating overning authority to a sub- 
unit of Congress or a Congressional agent, such legislation does 
not literally violate the Bicameral and Presentments Clauses. The 
statutes incorporating the delegations (which are the statutes held 
unconstitutional) technically comply with the Clauses-they have 
been passed by both Houses and signed by the President.108 The 
problem is that these statutes et up institutional mechanisms that 
would permit wholesale evasion of these Clauses in the future. 
Thus, the Court has invalidated statutes that permit Congress to 
assert extra-legislative governmental uthority because "[a]ny other 
conclusion would permit Congress to evade the 'carefully crafted' 
constraints of the Constitution."109 
The minimal conception of separation of powers, by forcing 
all federal offices into one of three constitutional branches, would 
function more generally to prevent evasion of the specific clauses 
of the Constitution. Because every federal office would be located 
in one of the branches, every office would be subject to one set of 
constitutional limitations-those that apply to the branch to which 
it belongs. To be sure, by transferring functions back and forth 
among the branches, Congress would have the power to shift from 
one set of limitations to another. But it could never circumvent 
the constitutional limitations altogether, and assuming that it was 
forced to give some functions to each branch (as I shall argue mo- 
mentarily it would be), each limitation would be given effect. 
The minimal conception would also create a dynamic tension 
between Congress and the other branches of government that 
would serve the central end of a system of separation of powers- 
the diffusion of power to "protect the liberty and security of the 
governed."110 Perhaps the easiest way of seeing this is to consider 
108 See Chadha, 462 US at 980 (White dissenting). 
'09 Washington Airports, 111 S Ct at 2308. Admittedly, the Court has been less vigilant 
about the possibility of evasion with respect to the Cases or Controversies limitation on the 
judicial branch. The decision in Mistretta, for example, seems to suggest that Article III 
judges may in special circumstances participate in legislative rulemaking. But at least at the 
rhetorical level, the Court has continued to insist that Article III courts are constitutionally 
restricted to deciding cases and controversies, see Morrison 487 US at 677, suggesting that 
at some point it would invalidate attempts to bypass this limitation too. 
110 Washington Airports, 111 S Ct at 2310. See also cases cited in note 26 . 
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the structure of options that the minimal understanding would 
present to Congress. This approach would give Congress unre- 
viewable discretion to delegate functions, but would impose strict 
limits on who may receive the delegation. Congress (a) could not 
delegate governing authority to a subunit of itself or to a Congres- 
sional agent, (b) could delegate to the federal courts only on the 
understanding that they would be limited to deciding cases and 
controversies, but (c) could make virtually unlimited delegations to 
the executive branch. How would Congress respond to this menu 
of options? 
Consider, first, the possibility that Congress might decide to 
assign all functions to itself. Because there would be no judicially 
enforced limits on the allocation of functions, it would be free to 
do this. But any governmental action by Congress (or an agent of 
Congress) must comply with the Bicameral and Presentment 
Clauses, and Congress is severely limited in the number of times it 
can surmount hese cumbersome barriers in any legislative session. 
Because the legislative agenda is a scarce resource, one would pre- 
dict that Congress, if it wanted to maximize its own influence 
within the tripartite system, would typically use the legislative 
process to promulgate general rules for the governance of society, 
and would resist requests to engage in the more routine and high- 
volume activities traditionally associated with the executive and 
judicial functions. The great reluctance of Congress to conduct 
impeachment proceedings,111 and the self-imposed limitations it 
has adopted on the use of private bills,112 tend to confirm these 
observations. 
Once Congress decides to delegate most routine functions out- 
side the legislative branch, its only options would be the judicial 
branch and the executive branch. Because courts cannot act expedi- 
tiously or on their own initiative, and could make law only through 
the development of federal common law, the best choice for most 
purposes would be the executive branch. But the President is his- 
torically the principal constitutional rival of the Congress, and so 
Congress would be reluctant to give unconstrained iscretion to 
the executive. Thus, the minimal understanding would provide an 
"' Mitch McConnell, Reflections on the Senate's Role in the Judicial Impeachment Process and 
Proposals for Change, 76 Ky L J 739 (1987-88). 
112 Note, Private Bills in Congress, 79 Harv L Rev 1684, 1688-93 (1966). 
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incentive for Congress to make key policy decisions itself through 
legislation-probably far more of an incentive than the toothless 
nondelegation doctrine provides. In addition, Congress would 
want some assurance that those executive entities that receive dele- 
gated power respect its intentions as set forth in general law."113 
Given that Congress is severely limited in its ability to enact reme- 
dial legislation correcting executive interpretations, the only effec- 
tive monitoring device would be to provide for judicial review by 
Article III courts.114 Thus, Congress would almost surely want to 
give the independent judiciary significant power to review execu- 
tive action. 
In short, given the three branches rule and the procedural limita- 
tions that attach to each branch, the most logical choices for Con- 
gress in disbursing functions would be to keep large elements of 
the lawmaking function for itself, give important elements of the 
case deciding function to the Article III courts, and transfer what 
is left over to the executive. The resulting allocation of powers 
would look very much like those that the formal and functional 
theories would have the judiciary impose directly through enforce- 
ment of some constitutionally compelled allocation of functions. 
For the same reasons that Congress would want to call upon the 
aid of each of the other two branches, it is not plausible that Con- 
gress would want seriously to "encroach" on their capacity to func- 
tion effectively. Thus, although it is possible to hypothesize various 
horribles-Congress demanding that C-Span be allowed to broad- 
cast from the Oval Office, or from the Conference Room of the 
Supreme Court-it is highly unlikely that any of these horribles 
would ever materialize. Because Congress would want each of the 
other branches to perform efficiently in order to realize its own 
objectives, it could not afford to adopt measures that would cripple 
the ability of the executive or the courts to function. 115 
13 William Landes and Richard Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest Group Per- 
spective, 18 J Law & Econ 875 (1975). 
114 See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L J 969, 
993-98 (1992); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the 
Administrative State, 89 Colum L Rev 452 (1989). 
15 If one thinks that the dynamic incentives created by the minimal construction are not 
enough to insure against congressional mischief, there is no reason why it could not be 
"backstopped" by some version of the core functions understanding. See note 49. Under 
such a dual theory, most of the work of preserving equilibrium among the branches would 
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In sum, the incentive structure created by the minimal under- 
standing would establish a dynamic tension that should lead Con- 
gress to allocate significant powers to all three constitutional 
branches. Because it would not trust the executive and judiciary 
with all functions of government, Congress would want to retain 
significant powers for itself. Yet because of the Bicameral and Pre- 
sentment Clauses, it would have to give significant powers away. 
Given its rivalry with the President, it would want to provide for 
a substantial measure of judicial review of executive action. And 
because of the disability of courts to govern other than through the 
cases or controversies, it could not dispense with the executive for 
most of what we regard as executive functions. Thus, the minimal 
understanding should lead to a dispersion of power among the 
branches-not because of direct judicial enforcement of an alloca- 
tion of governmental functions, but because of the incentive struc- 
ture presented to Congress. This dispersion, in turn, would pro- 
vide the foundation for the checking and balancing of governmental 
power that both the formalists and the functionalists seek as means 
of protecting liberty. 
C. TEXT AND ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING 
What about the ultimate touchstone of constitutional law: the 
text and original understanding of the Framers? The minimal con- 
ception of separation of powers would seem to be consistent with, 
but admittedly not compelled by, the text of the Constitution. To 
be sure, the opening clauses of Articles I, II, and III each speak in 
terms of the vesting certain "powers" in each of the three depart- 
ments of government: "All legislative Powers herein granted" are 
vested in the Congress;"116 "The executive Power" is vested in the 
President;"'17 and "The judicial Power" is vested in the Supreme 
Court and "in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time 
to time ordain and establish.""' These clauses provide some sup- 
be performed by the minimal understanding. But the core functions idea would be kept 
around, like an old gun in the closet, just in case this prediction proved wrong and Congress 
in a fit of pique tried to cripple one of the other branches. If this happened, the Court could 
declare an invasion of a "core" function not supported by adequate justification, and strike 
the encroachment down. 
116 US Const Art I, ? 1. 
117 Art II, ? 1. 
118 Art III, ? 1. 
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port for the shared assumption of the formalists and the functional- 
ists that the constitutional principle of separation of powers is con- 
cerned with the division of powers or functions among the branches 
of government, not just the assignment of federal offices to 
branches. 
But the text provides very little support for the further proposi- 
tion that the Constitution adopts a fixed definition or allocation of 
the three powers, certainly not to the degree necessary to support 
judicial enforcement comfortably. The Constitution makes no ef- 
fort to define the "legislative," executive," and "judicial" powers. 
Instead, it specifically confers power on Congress "[t]o make all 
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Ex- 
ecution the foregoing [legislative] powers, and all other powers 
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
States .. 
.".119 
Thus, the text plausibly can be read as committing 
questions about the definition and allocation of the three great pow- 
ers to Congress, not the courts. 
Nor does the federal Constitution, like some of the state constitu- 
tions of the period, contain a clause requiring that the functions or 
powers given to the different branches remain separate.120 Indeed, 
an amendment that would have committed the national govern- 
ment to something like the exclusive functions construction121 was 
proposed as part of the package of provisions that became the bill 
of rights, but was rejected by the Senate. 122 The failure of such an 
amendment is notoriously ambiguous: it could either mean that the 
Senate thought the principle of strict functional division ought not 
to be in the Constitution, or that it thought it was already reflected 
119 Art I, ? 8, cl 18 (emphasis added). 
120 For example, the Virginia Constitution of 1776 provided: "The legislative, executive, 
and judiciary department, shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers 
properly belonging to the other: nor shall any person exercise the powers of more than one 
of them, at the same time. .. ." 7 Francis N. Thorpe, The Federal and State Constitutions, 
Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States 3815 (1909). 
121 The Sixteenth Article of Amendments approved by the House on August 24, 1789, 
provided: 
The powers delegated by the Constitution to the government of the United States, 
shall be exercised as therein appropriated, so that the Legislative shall never exer- 
cise the powers vested in the Executive or Judicial; nor the Executive the powers 
vested in the Legislative or Judicial; nor the Judicial the powers vested in the 
Legislative or Executive. 
Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, A History of the American Constitution 436 (1990). 
122 Edward Dumbauld, The Bill of Rights and What It Means Today 46-47 (1957). 
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in the Constitution, making the amendment unnecessary. But 
given that the first Congress did not shy away from adopting two 
other "truistic" or "redundant" amendments-the Ninth and the 
Tenth123-_it is plausible to think that some persons may have re- 
garded the proposed separation-of-powers amendment not just as 
clarifying what was already implicit in the document but rather as 
imposing an unwanted restriction on congressional discretion to 
organize the new government. 
On the other hand, the text of the constitution is surely consis- 
tent with the proposition that there are only three branches of 
government. The first hree articles of the Constitution are not just 
about "powers," they are about institutions. At the highest level 
there are only three institutions: "a Congress of the United 
States,"'124 "a President of the United States of America,"z25 and 
"one supreme Court."126 A number of other institutions are also 
mentioned: "Departments," "the Army," "the Navy," and "inferior 
Courts." But it is clear from context that, three of these subordinate 
institutions-"Departments," "the Army," and "the Navy"-are 
accountable to the President. The Departments are at one point 
referred to as "executive Departments," where it is further specified 
that the President may require the opinion in writing of the princi- 
pal officer of each on any subject relating to the duties of his of- 
fice.127 And the President is expressly made the commander-in- 
chief of the Army and Navy.128 The other named institution-the 
inferior courts-is expressly placed in the judicial branch. Thus, 
it is entirely natural to construe the Constitution as creating a gov- 
ernment with three and only three branches of government. 
What we know of the drafting history sheds virtually no light 
on whether the Framers would have preferred a functions-oriented 
123 See United States v Darby, 312 US 100, 124 (1941) ("The [Tenth] Amendment states 
but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered."); Griswold v Connecticut, 
381 US 479, 529-30 (1965) (Stewart dissenting) ("The Ninth Amendment, like its compan- 
ion the Tenth, [was adopted] to make clear that the adoption of the Bill of Rights did not 
alter the plan that the Federal Government was to be a government of express and limited 
powers"). 
124 US Const Art I, ? 1. 
125 Art II, ? 1. 
126 Art III, ? 1. 
127 US Const Art II, ? 2, cl 1 (emphasis added). 
128 Id. 
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or a three-branches construction of the Constitution. The Commit- 
tee of the Whole adopted a resolution on May 30, 1787 stating 
"that a national government ought to be established consisting of 
a supreme legislative, judiciary, and executive." This resolution is 
facially consistent with either a functions or branches construction. 
We will never know which was intended, for as Gerhard Casper 
has observed, "this event was the beginning and the end of the 
consideration of separation of powers as such in the Convention."129 
The current language referring to legislative, executive, and judi- 
cial "powers" was first added the Committee on Detail on August 
9.130 It does not appear to have generated any discussion at that 
time, and remained (at least in this respect) unchanged until the 
final draft was agreed upon. 
The ratification materials, on the other hand, provide evidence 
that at least one important Framer-James Madison-thought of 
separation of powers in terms closer to what I have called the 
minimal conception than to either of the rival theories. Many anti- 
Federalists criticized the Constitution because it contained too 
many departures from a pure model of separation of powers.131 
Madison set about responding to these concerns in The Federalist 
with two lines of thought. One, which was expressed in No. 37, 
was to deny that any pure theory of separation of powers was 
possible:132 
Experience has instructed usthat no skill in the science of Gov- 
ernment has yet been able to discriminate and define, with 
sufficient certainty, its three great provinces, the Legislative, 
Executive and Judiciary; . .. Questions daily occur in the 
course of practice, which prove the obscurity which reigns in 
these subjects, and which puzzle the greatest adepts in political 
science. 
Obviously, this response does not suggest any understanding 
that the Constitution incorporated a fixed definition or allocation 
of governmental functions, such as might be enforced by courts. 
The other Madisonian response, laid out in Nos. 47-51, was 
129 Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30 
Wm & Mary L Rev 211, 220 (1989). 
130 Farber & Sherry at 423 (cited in note 121). 
131 Herbert J. Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For 55 (1981). 
132 Federalist 37 (Madison) in Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist 235 (1961). 
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that even if a strict division of powers was possible, it was not 
desirable. Here Madison stressed the futility of trying "to mark 
with precision the boundaries of these departments in the Constitu- 
tion of the government, and to trust to these parchment barriers 
against the encroaching spirit of power.""'133 Instead, he argued that 
separation could only be maintained by "so contriving the interior 
structure of the government, as that its several constituent parts 
may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other 
in their proper places."134 
In effect, Madison argued that the structure of government es- 
tablished by the Constitution would be preserved through institu- 
tional competition-ambition made to counteract ambition 3s5 
rather than by through any direct enforcement of definitions of 
powers. This understanding is far more consistent with the mini- 
mal understanding than with either formalism or functionalism. 
The minimal approach would call upon courts to preserve a govern- 
ment of three branches, with all federal offices assigned to one of 
those branches, and it would do so in part to create the conditions 
that give rise to institutional competition. In contrast, both formal- 
ism and functionalism would have courts enforce the "parchment 
barriers" that Madison disparaged. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The "constitutional principle of separation of powers" could 
be understood to mean any one of several different things. It could 
mean, as the formalists argue, that each branch has exclusive power 
to perform a single designated function, unless the Constitution 
expressly permits an exception. Or it could mean, as the functional- 
ists believe, that courts should strive to maintain a diffusion of 
power among the branches. Conceivably, it could mean nothing- 
the constitutional principle of separation of powers could just be a 
shorthand reference for the sum of all specific clauses that govern 
relations among the branches, but add nothing to what these 
clauses individually require. Each of these interpretations would 
have serious drawbacks. The exclusive functions construction 
'33 Federalist 48 (Madison), id at 332-33. 
134 Federalist 51 (Madison), id at 347-48. 
135 Id at 349. 
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would be too rigid, the diffusion of power understanding too flexi- 
ble, and neither comports with the full range of Supreme Court 
decisions defining the structural Constitution. The conclusion that 
the principle adds nothing to the specific clauses would be more 
consistent with the pattern of outcomes reached by the Supreme 
Court, but would be an open invitation to create a Fourth Branch 
of government that would permit massive evasions of those clauses 
in the future. 
A better strategy would be to interpret the principle as incorpo- 
rating a minimal requirement that there be only three branches, 
with every federal office accountable to one of the constitutional 
branches. Such an understanding would provide substantial conti- 
nuity with the past: it would be consistent with the text of the 
Constitution and with Madison's explanation of the mechanism for 
preserving the constitutional structure, and would not contradict 
any of the Supreme Court's judgments in major separation-of- 
powers cases. For the future, it would prevent Congress from cir- 
cumventing the specific clauses of the Constitution that limit the 
power of the branches, and would preserve the dynamic tension 
among the branches that has worked well for over 200 years in 
maintaining "the liberty and security of the governed.""136 
136 Washington Airports, 111 S Ct at 2310. 
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